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2009Abstract
The post-issue underperformance of seasoned equity oﬀering (SEO) is generally ex-
plained by asymmetric information and deteriorating operating performance. We
complement these traditional explanations with a new parameter, the liquidity, which
results from the change of capital structure due to equity oﬀering. The new issuing
of equity lowers the debt to asset ratio, lowers the information asymmetry, thus in-
creasing stock liquidity, which is in accordance with the hypotheses presented by
Kyle(1985)’s model; Evidence that stocks become more liquid after SEO, thus lower
the expected return, resulting to underperformance, combined with the high stock
illiquidity before SEO, which coincides the high return, proving that Amihud’s (2002)
hypothesis about the relation between liquidity and stock is applicable in explaining
the stock return puzzle during SEO period.
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Introduction
Many studies have documented that ﬁrms conducting seasoned equity oﬀerings
have abnormally low stock returns during the ﬁve years after the oﬀering, following
a sharp run-up in the year prior to the oﬀering. Loughran and Ritter (1997) report
that the average raw return for issuing ﬁrms is only 7 percent per year during the
ﬁve years after the oﬀering, compared to 15 percent per year for non-issuing ﬁrms of
the same market capitalization. These low post-issue returns follow extremely high
returns in the year prior to the oﬀering, 72 percent on average. And the magnitude
of the SEO underperformance is economically important according to Loughran and
Ritter (1995). They ﬁnd, based upon the realized returns, an investor would have had
to invest 44 percent more money in the issuers than in nonissuers of the same size to
have the same wealth ﬁve years after the SEO date, using the data from 1970 to 1990.
There are abundant literatures trying to capture the SEO underperformance puz-
zle in terms of signaling, issue timing and the price elasticity of demand for new shares
et al. Factors such as investor behavior, price pressure, accounting performance and
demand-supply changes have been studied intensively. A primary explanation for
the long-term post SEO underperformance is the issue timing hypothesis, which also
purposes that the issue timing is related to earnings and dividend announcements.
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Most asset pricing researches testing the post-oﬀering performance are somehow
related to liquidity. The issue size, price pressure, and demand-supply can all be
attributed to the liquidity. Thus, I try to explore the linkage between the SEO un-
derperformance and liquidity.
In this article, we try to look into the SEO underperformance in the aspect of liq-
uidity change. As the hypothesis on the relationship between stock return and stock
liquidity is that return increases in illiquidity, as proposed by Amihud and Mendelson
(1986), we assume that, the liquidity change is one of the causes of the post SEO
underperformance and pre SEO overperformance.
Desirable characteristics for a security market include price discovery without
excess volatility and the provision of liquidity at low cost. The New York Stock
Exchange’s (NYSE) specialist-auction market and the NASDAQ dealer market each
provide price discovery and liquidity services for equity shares, but diﬀer substantially
in design. Execution costs, as measured by the quoted spread, the eﬀective spread
(which accounts for trades inside the quotes), the realized spread (which measures
revenues of suppliers of immediacy), the Roll (1984) implied spread, and the post-
trade variability, are twice as large for a sample of NASDAQ stocks as they are for a
matched sample of NYSE stocks.(Huang and Stoll, 1996).
Despite the long-standing debate over the relative merits of auction and dealer
markets, very few studies directly compare the eﬃciency of the two systems. In this
article, we test the liquidity around the SEO period separately on the three exchanges.
From our result using Amihud liquidity measure, on average, the illiquidity drops
about 55% from the level of 12 month before SEO for the oﬀering on NYSE, 70% for
the Nasdaq and 63% for the AMEX.
We ﬁnd that during the SEO period (a ﬁve year period before and after SEO),
the illiquidity has a positive relation with the stock return. The illiquidity is highCHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 3
before the SEO period and drop drastically after the SEO announcement. This is
the evidence that, the individual stock level liquidity, do play an important role in
explaining the SEO underperformance.
We also divided the illiquidity factor into expected illiquidity and unexpected
illiquidity. Generally, big companies suﬀer more from the unexpected illiquidity across
the three exchanges, and they are less vulnerable to the expected illiquidity, which
is signiﬁcant for the NYSE samples. Big ﬁrms on NASDAQ still suﬀer more from
expected illiquidity, compared with those on NYSE. We also ﬁnd that the more stock
issuing, relative to the previous capitalization, the more price impact will be caused by
expected illiquidity, while less by unexpected illiquidity. This implies that, the large
volume of new issuance conduct more information to the investor, thus decreasing
the information asymmetry, making the illiquidity impact more predictable.
Furthermore, we test the theoretical source the illiquidity. We believe the capital
structure change caused by the SEO makes the liquidity change. Therefore, we regress
the illiquidity on the corporate leverage. We ﬁnd the positive relation between the
leverage and the stock illiquidity, that the decreased leverage makes the stock more
liquid, and the large stocks are less aﬀected by the leverage changes. We also ﬁnd
the marginal illiquidity cost of leverage is big when the company deleveraging quite a
lot. The corporate operating performance is positively related to the stock liquidity.
And there is no evidence that the oﬀer premium, the oﬀer price relative to the stock
price around the SEO period, convey any information to the investors.Chapter 2
Literature Review
2.1 The puzzle of seasoned equity oﬀering
As Kahneman and Tversky (1982) proposed the widespread tendencies for humans
to overweight recent experience at the expense of long-term averages, a similar com-
ment is given by Loughran and Ritter (1997) that, market is in general too optimistic
about the prospects of issuing ﬁrms. This overreaction may be an explanation of the
signiﬁcant negative return of SEO, while whether or not there are tendencies for the
stock market to overextrapolate recent growth is controversial.
In corporate ﬁnance theory, the negative underpricing of SEO can be explained
by ”uncertainty and asymmetric information” of the corporate governance. In the
Myers and Majluf (1984) adverse selection model, rational investors presume that on
average managers approve stock oﬀerings when, based on their superior information,
they believe the stock is overvalued. This follows from the assumption that manager
decisions are made on behalf of existing shareholders, who gain if additional stock is
sold when it is overvalued and lose when undervalued. In order to compensate the
adverse selections that, informed investors will participate only in good issues, leaving
uninformed investors with a disproportionate share of bad issues, the underpricing
can be derived as the penalty.
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The Leland and Pyle (1977) signaling model predicts that changes in manage-
ment stockholdings cause like changes in ﬁrm value. Investors assume correctly that
management is better informed about the expected future cash ﬂows and that from
a diversiﬁcation standpoint, it is costly for managers to hold a signiﬁcant fraction of
ﬁrm stock. Thus, managers have incentives to hold large stock positions only if they
expect the future cash ﬂows to be high relative to the ﬁrm’s current value. Rational
investors will consider managers’ fractional stock ownership to be a credible signal
of ﬁrm value. Thus, a decrease in managements’ fractional shareholdings, induced
by a stock oﬀering to outside investors, is a negative signal about ﬁrm value. This
prediction is empirically supported in a study of initial public oﬀerings of stock by
Downs and Heinkel(1982).
Agency theory models as developed by Jensen and Meckling (1976) predict that
larger percentage shareholdings by management decrease the potential conﬂicts of
interest between managers seeking to maximize their own utility and outside share-
holders seeking to have share value maximized. Thus, any increase in outstanding
shares, which decreases management percentage shareholdings, is predicted to have
a negative impact on ﬁrm value and stock price. The larger the proportional size
of the stock oﬀering, the larger the predicted negative eﬀect on the ﬁrm (assuming
management does not subscribe to the oﬀering).
The underpricing of seasoned oﬀers may also be related to either permanent or
temporary price pressures, (Corwin, S. A. (2003)). If we view a seasoned oﬀer as
a permanent shift in the supply of existing shares, the aggregate demand curve for
the ﬁrm’s shares is downward sloping, then this increase in supply will result in a
permanent decrease in stock price. Alternatively, if one views a seasoned oﬀer as a
temporary liquidity shock that must be absorbed by the market, then a discounted
oﬀer price may be necessary to compensate investors for absorbing the additional
shares.CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 6
However, arguments about the date that such price pressure or illiquidity problem
is controversial, while evidence of price pressure on the announcement date is mixed.
Both Asquith and Mullins (1986) and Mikkelson and Partch (1985) ﬁnd a signiﬁcant
relation between announcement day returns and issue size, but Mikkelson and Partch
ﬁnd no evidence that this eﬀect is related to hypothesized determinants of demand
elasticity. Further, Mikkelson and Partch (1986) and Barclay ﬁnd no evidence of
a signiﬁcant relation between issue size and announcement eﬀects, while Shane A.
Corwin (2003) ﬁnds a positively relation between the oﬀer size and the securities
with relatively inelastic demand.
Previous studies test underpricing using the issue size, trade volume (block trade),
and the elasticity of the security demand. This provides the reasons that seasonal
equity oﬀering are related to liquidity. In fact, issue size, trade volume and security
demand-supply are all liquidity variables. Whether the increase in the supply of the
stock can be absorbed by the market smoothly depends on the market liquidity and
the stock liquidity. Such price pressure is the liquidity pressure or the unexpected
illiquidity caused by the sudden increase in the stock supply.
2.2 Liquidity and exchange mechanism
In testing the liquidity, we must diﬀerentiate the exchange factor. Several studies
report that trade execution costs are larger on the NASDAQ market than on the
NYSE. Huang and Stoll (1996), for example, examine a matched sample of large
capitalization ﬁrms and ﬁnd that trade execution costs during 1991 were more than
twice as large on NASDAQ. Bessembinder and Kaufman (1997) use data from 1994
and extend the comparison to smaller ﬁrms, ﬁnding that the NYSE advantage in
trade execution costs is most notable for smaller ﬁrms and for small trades. Barclay
(1997), Christie and Huang (1994), and Bessembinder (1997) examine companies
that move from NASDAQ to NYSE, each reporting substantial decreases in tradeCHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 7
execution costs upon exchange listing.
Moreover, On January 20, 1997, the Securities and Exchange Commission be-
gan implementing a new set of regulations that have drastically changed the way
the Nasdaq handles orders. These regulations were formulated in response to evi-
dence of imperfect competition under the Nasdaq’s previous trading rules, due to the
avoidance of odd-eighth quotes documented by Christie and Schultz (1994) and the
large diﬀerence in trading costs compared to the NYSE, reported by Huang and Stoll
(1996), which have led some researchers and policymakers to question the eﬃciency
of the Nasdaq’s dealer market structure.
There is evidence that, the new regulations have increased competitive pressure
on Nasdaq market makers in two primary ways. First, they require that public limit
orders be allowed to compete with Nasdaq market makers. Second, market makers
who post orders on proprietary trading systems are now obligated to make those
orders available to the public as well. (Weston, 2000).
The size eﬀect, i.e. the company’s market capitalization, is also important across
the exchange. It is worthwhile to examining small and medium capitalization ﬁrms
along with large capitalization ﬁrms, since overall market-making costs and the rela-
tive signiﬁcance of various cost components potentially vary across ﬁrm size groups
and across exchanges. Kleidon and Willig (1996) argue that the structure of the
NASDAQ market, where each dealer sees only a portion of the total order ﬂow,
leaves dealers more vulnerable to adverse selection costs arising from losses on trades
with better informed agents. Easley, Kiefer, O’Hara, and Paperman (1996) report
that, the probability of informed trading is greater for less actively traded stocks.
Since less actively traded stocks tend to be smaller ﬁrms, greater adverse selection
costs may justify higher execution costs on NASDAQ, particularly for small ﬁrms.
The inventory costs of market-making are also likely to be greater for small ﬁrms, due
to greater return volatility and more diﬃculty in unwinding inventory imbalances in
thin markets. The presence of multiple dealers on NASDAQ allows for inter-dealerCHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 8
trades and may facilitate inventory rebalancing. Chan and Lakonishok (1993) have
ventured that the NASDAQ market structure may provide a comparative advantage
in executing trades for smaller ﬁrms, while the NYSE has a comparative advantage
in executing large ﬁrm trades.
Thus, this article provides direct comparisons of illiquidity impact on stock return
in small and large ﬁrms on each exchange, both before and after the seasoned equity
oﬀering.
2.3 Liquidity and corporate capital structure
For the relation between capital structure and liquidity, since Modigliani and
Miller’s (MM) (1958) proposition that leverage (the proportion of debt ﬁnancing)
does not aﬀect ﬁrm value in a perfect world, there have been a number of theories
explaining how debt can aﬀect ﬁrm value1. A common synthesis of these theories
implies that ﬁrms should trade-oﬀ the costs and beneﬁts of leverage, by choosing the
optimal amount of debt ﬁnancing that maximizes ﬁrm value. A possible mitigating
factor in debt usage is the ancillary eﬀect on the costs of equity trading. Increasing
debt in the capital structure using pure leverage recapitalizations results in increased
information asymmetry in the remaining equity. The consequent eﬀect is increasing
equity liquidity costs that aﬀect the ﬁrm’s cost of capital (Amihud and Mendelson,
1989). Examining the interaction between debt usage and equity trading costs is
important to better understanding the possible costs of debt ﬁnancing thus adding to
our understanding of the determinants of optimal capital structure. Models of price
formation in securities markets suggest that privately informed investors create signif-
icant illiquidity costs (Kyle, 1985), implying that the corporate cost of equity capital
should be higher for illiquid securities. Amihud and Mendelson (1986) argue that
1For example, leverage can aﬀect ﬁrm value through the eﬀect of taxes (MM (1963), Dammon and
Senbet (1988), Ross (1985)), incentive eﬀects (Jensen and Meckling (1976), Myers (1977)), incom-
plete contracting (Townsend (1977)), market completion (Allen and Gate (1991)) and information
asymmetry (Myers and Majluf (1984)). Harris and Raviv (1991) summarize these leverage theories.CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 9
stocks include a signiﬁcant risk premium for the quoted spread, because investors re-
quire compensation for higher expected trading costs. Brennan and Subrahmanyam
(1996) ﬁnd a signiﬁcant relation between required rates of return and measures of
illiquidity after adjusting for price level and risk factors2. Using pure leverage re-
capitalizations, we argue that privately informed traders increase their information
advantage, because debt ﬁnancing concentrates their information advantage in the
remaining equity. The increased information asymmetry is reﬂected in increased eq-
uity trading costs. We ﬁnd that ﬁrms that undergo a pure substitution of debt for
equity (or equity for debt) experience economically relevant and statistically signiﬁ-
cant liquidity cost changes around the leverage recapitalization, and interpret this as
caused by increases (decreases) in information asymmetry.
A related empirical literature links capital structure and equity liquidity. Bharath,
Pasquariello and Wu (2008) show ﬁrms that use a higher percentage of debt ﬁnanc-
ing have lower equity liquidity, and claim that this relationship conﬁrms the pecking
order theory. They attribute equity illiquidity to exogenous information asymmetry,
and argue that higher information asymmetry leads to larger use of debt, to avoid
information asymmetry costs. However, the results in this paper show that using
debt itself causes the lower liquidity of equity and the companies tend to use equity-
ﬁnancing when the stock liquidity is low. The marginal cost of leverage is large for
the companies deleverage quite a lot.
Therefore, it is probably that ﬁrms with higher debt to equity ratios simply have
higher asymmetry information because larger debt ﬁnancing is causing the higher
information asymmetry. However, our explanation is diﬀerent from that proposed
by Weston, Butler, and Grullon (2005) who suggest that the ﬁrm’s equity liquidity
aﬀects the ease with which a company can raise external capital. Our paper posits
2Supporting evidence concerning liquidity is provided by Amihud, Mendelson, and Lauterbach
(1998), Amihud, (2000), Datar, Naik, and Radcliﬀ (1998), and Brennan, Chordia, and Subrah-
manyam (1998).CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 10
leverage choice aﬀecting equity liquidity rather than equity liquidity aﬀecting leverage
choice.Chapter 3
Empirical Methodology
There are 11551 samples of the seasoned equity oﬀering in the NYSE, NASDQ and
AMEX from 1980 to 2006 from the SDC (Securities Data Company). Several data
restrictions are present in this study: the issuing ﬁrms must be present on the COM-
PUSTAT (primary industrial, supplementary industrial, tertiary, full coverage, and
industrial research) dataset for the ﬁscal year of the oﬀering, and they must be on the
University of Chicago Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) dataset on the
issue date to be included in the sample. The oﬀer must be a cash oﬀer of common
stock. This follows Healy and Palepu’s (1990) procedure and excludes SEOs by the
same ﬁrm during the ﬁve years after an SEO that is in our sample, for these oﬀerings
cause the dependence for the statistical tests. Thus, once a ﬁrm has a seasoned equity
oﬀering, that ﬁrm cannot reenter the SEO sample until ﬁve years from the issue date
have passed. I also require that the book value of assets at the end of the ﬁscal year
of issuing be at least $20 million1, and the utility oﬀering2 is also excluded. Finally
we have a sample of 7344 SEO during 1980 to 2006.
1This follows Loughran and Ritter (1997) criteria. They require that the book value of assets
at the end of the ﬁscal year of issuing be at least $20 million, measured in terms of dollars of 1993
purchasing power.
2Because utility oﬀerings tend to be diﬀerent from those of other operating companies, we exclude
all utility oﬀerings (standard industrial classiﬁcation (SIC) codes 491 to 494) from our sample.
11CHAPTER 3. EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY 12
The data restriction for the cross-section liquidity model also follows Amihud
(2002) method:
Within the test window from month m =  60 to m = 60, in the daily data in
that period,
1. The stock has return and volume data for more than 24 month before the issue
month m = 0; also, the stock must have been listed at least two years, i.e.
before the month m =  243;
2. The stock monthly average price is greater than $5 at the issue month, m = 0;
3. The stock has data on market capitalization during the test period in the CRSP
database;
4. Outliers that, the highest or lowest 1% tails of the distribution of estimated
liquidity indices (after satisfying criteria) are eliminated.
3.1 The illiquidity and stock return
3.1.1 Cross-section estimation
The eﬀect of illiquidity on stock return during the SEO period is examined for
stocks traded in the NYSE, NASDQ and AMEX in the years 1980-2006, using data
from daily and monthly databases of CRSP. We choose a ﬁve-year test window before
and after the SEO month, which captures almost the entire period of SEO stock
performance. The ﬁve-year interval is based upon the evidence in Loughran and Ritter
(1995), who reports the SEO underperformance for approximately ﬁve years. We
deﬁne the oﬀering month is the month m=0, then the test window is from m =  60
to m = 60. Tests are divided into three exchanges because of the diﬀerences in
3The 24 months period before SEO is used because of the beta is estimated from the previous
24 month stock price performance.CHAPTER 3. EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY 13
market microstructures4 . The test procedure follows the Fama and MacBeth(1973)
method. A cross-section model is estimated for each month m =  60, 59,...  
1,0,1,2,...,59,60, where monthly stock returns are a function of stock characteristics:
Rim = kim +
J ∑
j=1
kjmXji,m + Uim (3.1)
Rim is the return on stock i on the month m ,with returns including the dividends
and Xji,m is characteristic j of stock i, estimated from date in month m. Xji,t 1 in-
cludes the variables as beta, liquidity, issue volume, issue size relative to the company
size and a January dummy is also included to capture the January abnormality. The
coeﬃcient kim is the eﬀects of stock characteristics on expected return and Uim are
the residuals.
BETA We estimate the beta for every stock every month during the test period.
We use the rolling method, from the daily stock price data 24 months before to
the previous month. The estimation method is based on Fama and MacBeth (1973),
presented in the equation (3.2). The market return RMt, is the value-weighted market
return, Rft is the risk free return, using the contemporaneous Treasury-bill rate and
is the estimated slope coeﬃcient.
Rit   Rft = α + β(RMt   Rft) + σ (3.2)
AILLIQt. The daily stock illiquidity is the ratio of the daily absolute return to
the dollar trading volume on that day, jRitj/V OLD  Rit is the return on stock i
on day t and V OLDit is the respective daily volume in dollars, which follows Kyle’s
concept of illiquidity-the response of price to order ﬂow-and Silber’s (1975) measure
of thinness, deﬁned as the ratio of absolute price change to absolute excess demand
4Reinganum (1990) works on the eﬀects of the diﬀerences in microstructure between the NASDAQ
and the NYSE on stock returns, after adjusting for size and risk. In addition, volume ﬁgures on the
NASDAQ have a diﬀerent meaning than those on the NYSE, because trading on the NASDAQ is
done almost entirely through market makers, whereas on the NYSE most trading is done directly
between buying and selling investors. This results in artiﬁcially higher volume ﬁgures on NASDAQ.CHAPTER 3. EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY 14
for trading, noted as ILLIQ.
AILLIQim = 1/Ni
Ni ∑
t=1
ILLIQit (3.3)
The monthly average illiquidity, AiLLIQm is the average AILLIQt. in that month.
Ni is the number of observations in that month. LnAilliqm is the logarithm of the
daily stock Ailliq.
3.1.2 Time-series estimation
Following Amihud (2002) method to test the eﬀect of market illiquidity on stock
excess return, we estimate the individual stock return on the expected stock liquidity
and market liquidity. The model is described as:
E(Rim   RfmjlnAILLIQ
E
im) = f0 + f1 lnAILLIQ
E
im (3.4)
Rim is daily stock return for stock i day m, Rfm is the risk-free return, (using the
contemporaneous Treasury-bill rate) and lnAILLIQE
im is the expected stock illiquid-
ity for month m
Also, assuming illiquidity can be predicted from the information available in day
m   1, then stock daily illiquidity is assumed to follow the AR(1) process:
lnAILLIQim = c0 + c1 lnAILLIQi,m 1 + vm (3.5)
Then the expected illiquidity of the stock can be generated as:
lnAILLIQ
E
i,m = c0 + c1 lnAILLIQi,m 1 (3.6)CHAPTER 3. EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY 15
The calculation of daily market illiquidity is used the similar method, so the time-
series model (3.5) can be reiterated as following:
(Rt   Rf)m = f0 + f1 lnAILLIQ
E
m + um = g0 + g1 lnAILLIQm 1 + um (3.7)
Denote the residual um, wm as the unexpected stock return, then integrate the
contemporaneous and unexpected stock return to the model:
(Rt   Rf)m = g0 + g1 lnAILLIQi,m 1 + g2lnAILLIQ
U
i,m + wm (3.8)
Model (3.8) is to estimate eﬀect of the expected illiquidity and the unexpected illiq-
uidity, of both individual level and market level, on the stock price after issue day.
Both the lnAILLIQi,m 1 and lnAILLIQU
im may positively correlated to the return.
3.2 The illiquidity and capital structure
Following Kyle’s (1985) competitive equilibrium solution, shown in Appendix B,
the relation between the ﬁrm’s capital structure and the underlying equity liquidity
is positive. Following is the proof.
Given the assumption of exogenous liquidity demand, increases in leverage at the
initial date 0 decreases the equity liquidity at date 1.
Proof: As shown in Appendix B, the depth, or the sensitivity to order ﬂow, is
deﬁned as L = 1/ (the measure of liquidity in the market). Using Kyle’s result, it
can be shown that equity liquidity, L, is given by:
L =
1
λ
=
2σu
σϵ
(
1 + D
S0
) (3.9)
Equation (3.9) shows an inverse relation between liquidity and leverage. For
highly levered ﬁrms, the level of liquidity costs is higher (lower liquidity) comparedCHAPTER 3. EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY 16
to less levered ﬁrms, ceteris paribus. Diﬀerentiating the expression for the liquidity,
L, and assuming a value preserving recapitalization (so that dD = dS), with respect
to leverage, D/S, we get:
dL
d(D/S)
=
 2σ
σϵ
(
1 + D
S0
) (3.10)
with simplifying this relation reduces to:
dL
d(D/S)
=
 L
(
1 + D
S0
) (3.11)
Equation (3.11) is clearly negative and the larger the initial value of the ratio
between liquidity (transaction costs) and leverage, the larger the liquidity change.
Equation (3.11) is also monotonically decreasing in leverage, so that (3.9) has a
maximum at zero leverage. Therefore, debt ﬁnancing reduces the depth or liquidity
of the ﬁrm’s equity and equity ﬁnancing increases the liquidity of the ﬁrm’s equity.
Thus, we examine the empirical relation between the liquidity and leverage in the
event of SEOs. The test controls for the commonly used variables that explain the
cross-sectional variation in liquidity (Stoll 2000). We regress the illiquidity measure
Ailliq on the corporate characteristics. The estimation period is 1980-2006. The
capital structure measure is the estimation result from a regression using monthly
variables, which are summarized from daily data. The measure is an estimate of the
Kyle model’s (1985). The capital structure measure is DTA, debt divided by the
total asset. The control variables are lncshtrq, Prcstd, TobinQ and ROA. lncshtrq
is the number of shares transacted during the past month, which is log scaled. Prcstd
is the daily stock price standard deviation in one month. TobinQ is deﬁned as long
term assets plus the diﬀerence between the market value of equity to the book value
of equity divided by the book value of assets using the annual Compustat database
measured in each of the pre and post SEO periods. ROA is the measure of return ofCHAPTER 3. EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY 17
return of equity, which is the net income divided by total assets.
So the regression for testing the liquidity and corporate characteristics is:
Ailliq = α1 + α2  DTA + α3  lncshtrq + α4  Prcstd
+α5  TobinQ + α6  ROA + σ (3.12)Chapter 4
Empirical Result
4.1 Liquidity and stock return
Using Amihud illiquidity measure, a time-series average illiquidity level is calculated
from the sample data. From Figure 4.1 to Figure 4.6, we present the average stock
return and illiquidity level from the month =  60 to the month = 60 relative to
the SEO month. The trend of illiquidity and stock return is quite similar among
the three exchanges. The illiquidity drops about 55% from the level of 12 month
before the SEO on the NYSE, 70% on the Nasdaq and 63% on the AMEX. And the
stock monthly average return rises more than 100% from the 12 month before SEO
level, and then drops 80% after the SEO announcement on NYSE. On Nasdaq and
AMEX, the monthly average stock return rise about 100% and peak at 0.09 and 0.08
respectively, then drop to negative after SEO announcement.
From the descriptive statistics, we ﬁnd the illiquidity change is most ﬁerce on the
Nasdaq and then AMEX. It’s reasonable that, trading on the NASDAQ is done almost
entirely through market makers. So this could make the trading volume artiﬁcially
high. While through the change of company characteristics, the liquidity change is
more apparent on NASDAQ.
Table 4.1 presents the means of the coeﬃcients from the monthly cross-sectional
18CHAPTER 4. EMPIRICAL RESULT 19
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Figure 4.1: The Stock Illiquidity around SEO period–NYSE
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Figure 4.2: The Stock Monthly return around SEO period–NYSECHAPTER 4. EMPIRICAL RESULT 20
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Figure 4.3: The Stock Illiquidity around SEO period–NASDAQ
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Figure 4.4: The Stock Monthly return around SEO period– NASDAQCHAPTER 4. EMPIRICAL RESULT 21
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Figure 4.5: The Stock Illiquidity around SEO period–AMEX
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Figure 4.6: The Stock Monthly return around SEO period– AMEXCHAPTER 4. EMPIRICAL RESULT 22
regression of stock excess return (the stock return in excess of Treasury bill rate)
on the respective variables. In each month of year, y = 1980,1981,...,2005,2006,
stock returns are regressed cross-sectionally on stock characteristics that are calcu-
lated from data in the respective years and months. The data include 324 months
over 26 years, 1980-2006. Stocks admitted all experienced seasoned equity oﬀering
and have more than 24 months of data of the calculation of the characteristics during
the SEO period. Beta is the slope coeﬃcient from a 2 year time-series regression of
daily return on the market return (equally weighted). The stock’s Beta is calculated
based on the daily return of previous 24 months and market return. The illiquid-
ity measure LnAilliq is the logarithm of the daily stock Ailliq, which is calculated
as the daily absolute stock return divided by the daily dollar volume of the stock.
LnUailliq is the unexpected illiquidity, the residual from an autoregressive model of
LnAilliq. LnAilliq and LnUailliq, both are generated following Amihud’s (2002)
model. Lndollar is the dollar issue volume of the seasoned equity oﬀering. Issuesize
is the ratio of the dollar issue volume to the stock book value before the oﬀering. Jan-
dum is the January dummy. Jandum = 1, if it is January, otherwise, Jandum = 0.
T-statistics are in parentheses.CHAPTER 4. EMPIRICAL RESULT 23
Table 4.1: Cross-section regressions of stock return during SEO period on
illiquidity and other characteristics
This table presents the means of the coeﬃcients from the monthly cross-sectional
regression of stock excess return (the stock return in excess of Treasury bill rate) on
the respective variables. In each month of year, y = 1980,1981,...,2005,2006, stock
returns are regressed cross-sectionally on stock characteristics that are calculated
from data in the respective years and months. The data include 324 months over
26 years, 1980-2006. Stocks admitted all experienced seasoned equity oﬀering and
have more than 24 months of data of the calculation of the characteristics during the
SEO period. Beta is the slope coeﬃcient from a 2 year time-series regression of daily
return on the market return (equally weighted). The stock’s Beta is calculated based
on the daily return of previous 24 months and market return. The illiquidity measure
LnAilliq is the logarithm of the daily stock Ailliq, which is calculated as the daily
absolute stock return divided by the daily dollar volume of the stock. LnUailliq is
the unexpected illiquidity, the residual from an autoregressive model of LnAilliq.
LnAilliq and LnUailliq, both are generated following Amihud’s (2002) model.
Lndollar is the dollar issue volume of the seasoned equity oﬀering. Issuesize is the
ratio of the dollar issue volume to the stock book value before the oﬀering. Jandum
is the January dummy. Jandum = 1, if it is January, otherwise, Jandum = 0.
T-statistics are in parentheses.
Panel A: NYSE
Variable 1980-2006 1980-1997 1998-2006 1980-2006 1980-1997 1998-2006
Intercept 0.0107 0.0073 0.0104 -0.0431 0.0110 -0.0858
(6.18) (2.39) (5.04) (-4.99) (0.95) (-6.14)
Beta 0.0042 0.0076 0.0050 0.0053 0.0080 0.0056
(3.18) (2.37) (2.77) (4.67) (3.87) (3.86)
lnAilliqm 1 0.0012 0.0013 0.0016 0.0026 0.0019 0.0036
(5.29) (4.13) (4.85) (5.56) (2.84) (6.05)
lnUailliqm 0.0065 0.0022 0.0115 0.0069 0.0025 0.0120
(5.77) (1.77) (6.87) (6.19) (2.07) (7.18)
lndollar 0.0030 -0.0003 0.0054
(6.34) (-0.40) (7.00)
Issue/Size -0.4035 -0.5442 -0.3649
(-5.67) (-5.49) (-3.65)
Jandum 0.0053 0.0265 -0.0080
(3.22) (7.70) (-3.66)CHAPTER 4. EMPIRICAL RESULT 24
Panel B: NASDAQ
Variable 1980-2006 1980-1997 1998-2006 1980-2006 1980-1997 1998-2006
Intercept 0.0159 0.0128 0.0169 -0.2233 -0.2436 -0.2036
(8.95) (7.46) (10.98) (-17.76) (-11.01) (-12.71)
Beta -0.0032 -0.0019 -0.0032 -0.0053 -0.0027 -0.0056
(-1.71) (-1.70) (-2.81) (-1.61) (-1.43) (-1.91)
lnAilliqm 1 0.0011 -0.0001 0.0026 0.0045 0.0039 0.0052
(2.31) (-0.20) (4.83) (9.24) (7.43) (10.57)
lnUailliqm 0.0079 0.0026 0.0152 0.0088 0.0039 0.0153
(8.43) (2.60) (9.78) (9.66) (4.49) (9.85)
lndollar 0.0134 0.0147 0.0123
(11.13) (8.85) (8.75)
Issue/Size -0.1341 -0.5847 -0.1309
(-3.38) (-7.36) (-5.69)
Jandum 0.0424 0.0379 0.0440
(16.97) (7.58) (14.37)
Panel C: AMEX
Variable 1980-2006 1980-1997 1998-2006 1980-2006 1980-1997 1998-2006
Intercept 0.0166 0.0023 0.0224 -0.1141 -0.0617 -0.1518
(6.91) (0.61) (6.38) (-5.70) (-2.32) (-4.47)
Beta -0.0066 -0.0057 -0.0133 -0.0059 -0.0051 -0.0144
(-3.03) (-1.88) (-3.83) (-2.70) (-1.69) (-4.15)
lnAilliqm 1 0.0022 0.0031 0.0021 0.0041 0.0031 0.0044
(5.13) (1.06) (2.84) (7.54) (3.87) (4.97)
lnUailliqm 0.0027 0.0017 0.0060 0.0025 0.0008 0.0047
(1.93) (1.14) (2.01) (1.76) (0.53) (1.58)
lndollar 0.0073 0.0036 0.0098
(6.42) (2.33) (5.08)
Issue/Size -0.0050 0.4122 -0.0397
(-0.13) (2.44) (-0.83)
Jandum 0.0425 0.0448 0.0389
(10.71) (9.66) (5.71)CHAPTER 4. EMPIRICAL RESULT 25
Table 4.2: Cross-section regressions of stock return during SEO period on
illiquidity and other characteristics-Gibbs estimates
This table presents the means of the coeﬃcients from the monthly cross-sectional
regression of stock excess return (the stock return in excess of Treasury bill rate)
on the respective variables. In each month of year, y=1980, 1981, , 2006, stock
return s are regressed cross-sectionally on stock characteristics that are calculated
from data in the respective year and month. Beta is the slope coeﬃcient from a 2
year time-series regression of daily return on the market return (equally weighted).
The stock’s Beta is calculated based on the daily return of previous 24 months
and market return. For robustness check, we include Bayesian estimation using the
Gibbs sampler to proxy the illiquidity measure, as an alternative to Amihud’s ones.
cLevelMean is the estimator regarded as a drift of trading cost for an individual
stock, which can proxy the expected illiquidity, z is estimated as a latent factor, a
measure of innovation, common to eﬀective trading costs for all stocks, which can
proxy the unexpected illiquidity. We get the estimated variables from Hasbrouck’s
website and the two estimators are calculated annually . Lndollar is the dollar
issue volume of the seasoned equity oﬀering. Issuesize is the ratio of the dollar issue
volume to the stock book value before the oﬀering. Jandum is the January dummy.
Jandum = 1, if it is January, otherwise, Jandum = 0 The data include 324 months
over 26 years, 1980-2006. Stocks admitted all experienced seasoned equity oﬀering
and have more than 24 months of data of the calculation of the characteristics during
the SEO period. T-statistics are in parentheses.
Panel A: NYSE
Variable 1980-2006 1980-1997 1998-2006 1980-2006 1980-1997 1998-2006
Intercept 0.0115 0.0104 0.0102 0.0240 0.0109 0.0415
(8.22) (5.75) (4.24) (3.38) (0.86) (4.21)
Beta 0.0027 0.0027 0.0039 0.0025 0.0026 0.0044
(2.22) (1.59) (1.99) (2.04) (1.52) (2.19)
cLevelMean 0.0486 0.0361 0.0828 0.0582 0.0477 0.0835
(7.84) (4.7) (7.43) (8.58) (5.45) (7.48)
z -0.0099 -0.0027 -0.0188 -0.0107 -0.0013 -0.0184
(-5.94) (-1.14) (-8.35) (-6.36) (-0.51) (-8.15)
lndollar -0.0007 -0.0001 -0.0019
(-1.92) (-0.16) (-3.36)
Issue/Size 0.0540 0.2804 -0.2492
(0.82) (2.99) (-2.74)
Jandum 0.0060 -0.0112 0.027
(3.35) (-4.37) (10.98)CHAPTER 4. EMPIRICAL RESULT 26
Panel B: NASDAQ
Variable 1980-2006 1980-1997 1998-2006 1980-2006 1980-1997 1998-2006
Intercept 0.0238 0.0257 0.0224 -0.1027 -0.0956 -0.0546
(18.82) (11.35) (14.79) (-11.36) (-6.05) (-4.45)
Beta -0.0055 0.0044 -0.0102 -0.0099 0.0015 -0.0125
(-6.65) (2.63) (-10.59) (-11.24) (0.9) (-12.08)
cLevelMean 0.0402 -0.0219 0.0688 0.0371 -0.0185 0.0648
(8.54) (-2.81) (11.98) (7.87) (-2.37) (11.2)
z -0.0141 -0.0511 0.0044 -0.0188 -0.0515 -0.003
(-7.76) (-21.04) (1.87) (-10.31) (-21.19) (-1.25)
lndollar 0.0073 0.0071 0.0044
(13.9) (7.51) (6.23)
Issue/Size -0.0068 0.0487 0.0006
(-0.32) (0.47) (0.02)
Jandum 0.0501 0.0457 0.0484
(24.73) (14.86) (11.39)
Panel C: AMEX
Variable 1980-2006 1980-1997 1998-2006 1980-2006 1980-1997 1998-2006
Intercept 0.0258 0.0222 0.027 -0.0179 0.0053 -0.0400
(9.00) (5.66) (5.92) (-1.09) (0.25) (-1.31)
Beta -0.0069 0.0005 -0.0144 -0.0069 0.0015 -0.0157
(-3.12) (0.16) (-3.82) (-3.11) (0.52) (-4.1)
cLevelMean 0.0065 -0.0309 0.0525 0.0067 -0.0257 0.046
(0.39) (-1.45) (1.94) (0.40) (-1.21) (1.68)
z -0.0124 -0.0136 -0.0098 -0.0162 -0.0166 -0.0172
(-3.25) (-3.27) (-1.31) (-4.25) (-4.00) (-2.27)
lndollar 0.0024 0.0006 0.0038
(2.49) (0.43) (2.16)
Issue/Size 0.1109 0.7879 0.0711
(2.93) (5.62) (1.56)
Jandum 0.0449 0.047 0.0421
(11.01) (10.2) (5.56)CHAPTER 4. EMPIRICAL RESULT 27
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This ﬁgure presents the coeﬃcients from the monthly cross-sectional regression of NYSE stock
return on the variable LnAilliqm 1 on respective months during SEO period, i.e. M=-60,
-59,...,0,1,2,...,59,60. The following ﬁgure presents the t value of the estimation result.
Figure 4.7: Expected Liquidity impact around SEO period–NYSE
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This ﬁgure presents the coeﬃcients from the monthly cross-sectional regression of NASDAQ stock
return on the variable LnAilliqm 1 on respective months during SEO period, i.e. M=-60,
-59,...,0,1,2,...,59,60. The following ﬁgure presents the t value of the estimation result.
Figure 4.8: Expected Liquidity impact around SEO period–NASDAQ
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This ﬁgure presents the coeﬃcients from the monthly cross-sectional regression of AMEX stock
return on the variable LnAilliqm 1 on respective months during SEO period, i.e. M=-60,
-59,...,0,1,2,...,59,60. The following ﬁgure presents the t value of the estimation result.
Figure 4.9: Expected Liquidity impact around SEO period–AMEX
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4.1.1 Liquidity measure
The proposition here is that over time, expected illiquidity positively aﬀects ex-
pected stock return premium(the stock return in excess of Treasury bill rate). This
is consistent with the positive cross-sectional relationship between stock excess re-
turn and illiquidity. If investors anticipate higher market illiquidity, they will price
stocks so that they generate higher expected return. This suggests that stock excess
return, traditionally interpreted as ”risk premium” includes a premium for illiquidity.
Indeed, stocks are not only riskier, but are also less liquid than short-term Treasury
securities. First, both the bid-ask spread and the brokerage fees are much higher on
stocks than they are on Treasury securities. That is, illiquidity costs are greater for
stocks. Second, the size of transactions in the Treasury securities market is greater:
investors can trade very large amounts (tens of millions of dollars) of bills and notes
without price impact, but block transactions in stocks result in price impact that im-
plies high illiquidity costs. It thus stands to reason that the expected return on stocks
in excess of the yield on Treasury securities should be considered as compensation for
illiquidity, in addition to its standard interpretation as compensation for risk.
In our method, we test the eﬀect of illiquidity in terms of two aspects: 1, the
expected illiquidity and 2, the unexpected illiquidity. Using the methodology men-
tioned in Chapter Three, we decompose the illiquidity into the expected illiquidity
and unexpected illiquidity. From the calculation, we ﬁnd the expected illiquidity,
lnailliqm 1, that varies over the time and the unexpected illiquidity, lnUailliqm, is
relatively constant over the time. Thus we can propose that, it is the expected illiq-
uidity that aﬀect the stock expected return, and such expectation is realized during
the SEO period.
From Table 4.1, we ﬁnd the coeﬃcients of expected illiquidity and unexpected
illiquidity are all positive. Since the unexpected illiquidity, lnUailliqm, is relatively
constant over the SEO period, we regard it as a stochastic noise of the expected
illiquidity. Because of that, the coeﬃcient of the unexpected illiquidity has the sameCHAPTER 4. EMPIRICAL RESULT 31
sign as the coeﬃcient of expected illiquidity, which is positive. And the positive
relation between the expected illiquidity and the stock excess return is reconﬁrmed.
The coeﬃcient remains positive and signiﬁcant in the whole sample and the two
subsamples. We divide the sample before and after the year 1997, because the new
regulation drastically changed the way the Nasdaq handles orders. An interesting
ﬁnding is that, before 1997, the coeﬃcient of the expected illiquidity is negative and
insigniﬁcant for Nasdaq sample, while after 1997, it becomes positive and signiﬁcant.
We assume that, the new regulation aﬀected the relation between illiquidity and stock
return on Nasdaq. The trading cost on Nasdaq is much less after the 1997 reform
and the relation pattern of illiquidity and stock return becomes more similar as that
on the NYSE.
The coeﬃcient of the liquidity measure on Nasdaq is about twice bigger as the
NYSE. It’s also in accordance with the microstructure diﬀerence between the two
markets. Nasdaq, as a market maker driven market, the stock return is driven by the
market maker and the liquidity level tends to be artiﬁcially driven by them.
Moveover, we also include other liquidity measure to verify our hypothesis of the
relation between the stock return and the stock liquidity during the SEO period. We
choose the ”Eﬀective Spread” (variable cLevelMean) and ”Trading Cost Innovation”
(variable z) which are the results from the Bayesian estimation using the Gibbs sam-
pler.1 cLevelMean can be the proxy of the expected illiquidity, which is regarded as
a drift of trading cost for an individual stock. z can be the proxy of the unexpected
illiquidity as it is estimated as a latent factor, an measure of innovation, common to
eﬀective trading costs for all stocks. We get the estimated variables from Hasbrouck’s
website. The measures are computed from daily data, and compiled for each stock
on an annual basis. Therefore, it is an alternative way to test the pattern of the
stock return and liquidity we proposed before. The regression results are presented
in Table 4.2. It implies the Gibbs liquidity estimates have the similar relation with
1The construction of the liquidity measure is described in detail in Hasbrouck (2006) and in
documents on Hasbrouck’s website.CHAPTER 4. EMPIRICAL RESULT 32
the stock return as the Amihud’s illiquidity measures.
4.1.2 Control Variables
We include beta in the regression in Table 4.1, Beta on NYSE is positive and
signiﬁcant, as expected. Moreover, it becomes bigger and more signiﬁcant when other
control variables are included. The beta eﬀect is stronger for the period 1980-1997
and then drops a little bit recently.
The beta eﬀect is negative on Nasdaq and AMEX, surprisingly, which is insignif-
icant for Nasdaq and signiﬁcant for the overall sample regression on AMEX. It is
believe that, the beta risk is not reﬂected during the SEO period, at least, not a pri-
mary explanation, which is also presented by Loughran and Ritter (1995). In another
aspect, as proposed by Miller (1977), under the scarce short selling condition (which
is the case for Nasdaq and AMEX), the high beta stocks have the more diversity of
opinion or the uncertainty. The uncertainty is lowered as the seasoned equity oﬀer-
ing, the stocks become less risky, then their prices should drop. This may explain the
negative beta on the Nasdaq and AMEX during the SEO period.
The coeﬃcient of lndollar is positive and signiﬁcant, which implies that the more
the dollar volume of the issue, the higher will be the stock excess return. The result
is constant for the three exchanges. Issue/Size has the negative sign, implies that the
more equity issue relative to the company capitalization, the less will be the stock
return. However, this result is not signiﬁcant for AMEX. January dummy is generally
positive for the three exchanges. An exception is that, after 1998, the January dummy
on NYSE becomes negative and marginally signiﬁcant.
Figure 4.7 to 4.9 present the result of the estimated liquidity coeﬃcient. We did
cross-sectional regression for every month, m =  60, 59,..., 1,0,1,...,59,60. The
expected illiquidity aﬀect the stock return extensively and signiﬁcantly from m =  10
to m = 0 for NYSE and from m =  20 to m = 5 for Nasdaq. AMEX does not have
the similar signiﬁcance. And from the t-test result for the coeﬃcients of unexpectedCHAPTER 4. EMPIRICAL RESULT 33
illiquidity, only the Nasdaq sample has a period of signiﬁcant impact.
4.1.3 The size eﬀect of illiquidity
The eﬀect of market illiquidity on stock return over time varies between stocks by
their level of liquidity. In most cases, the liquidity level is highly correlated with the
company size. In an extreme case of a rise in illiquidity during the October 1987 crash
there was a ”ﬂight to liquidity”: that were more liquid stocks declined less in value,
after controlling for the market eﬀect and the stocks’ beta coeﬃcients (see Amihud et
al., 1990). This suggests the existence of two eﬀects on stock return when expected
market illiquidity rises:
(a) A decline in stock price and a rise in expected return, common to all stocks.
(b) Substitution from less liquid to more liquid stocks (”ﬂight to liquidity”).
For low-liquidity stocks the two eﬀects are complementary, both aﬀecting stock
returns in the same direction. However, for liquid stocks the two eﬀects work in
opposite directions. Unexpected rise in market illiquidity, which negatively aﬀects
stock prices, also increases the relative demand for liquid stocks and mitigates their
price decline. And, while higher expected market illiquidity makes investors demand
higher expected return on stocks, it makes liquid stocks relatively more attractive,
thus weakening the eﬀect of expected illiquidity on their expected return.
As a result, small, illiquid stocks should experience stronger eﬀects of market
illiquidity factor greater positive eﬀect of expected illiquidity on ex ante return and a
more negative eﬀect of unexpected illiquidity on contemporaneous return. For large
in capitalization, liquid stocks both eﬀects should be weaker, because these stocks
become relatively more attractive in times of dire liquidity. This hypothesis is tested
by estimating model (3.7) using returns on size-based portfolio. In addition, the size
variance of the three exchanges should be considered. NYSE sample has the biggest
size variance, Nasdaq’s is smaller and AMEX companies are almost all the small
companies.CHAPTER 4. EMPIRICAL RESULT 34
Table 4.3 presents the regression result of 10 sized portfolios, which is consistent
with the previous hypothesis. For the NYSE sample, the coeﬃcient of the expected
illiquidity declines almost monotonically in size (see Figure 4.10). The diﬀerence be-
tween the biggest size group and the smallest size group is signiﬁcant. The coeﬃcient
of the unexpected illiquidity rises in size, which implies that the big size ﬁrm suﬀers
more from unexpected illiquidity shock. The January abnormality aﬀects less the big
companies compared than the small companies.
For Nasdaq companies, the size variance among the companies is not that big as
the NYSE companies (see Figure 4.10), although the coeﬃcient of expected illiquidity
is slightly increasing in size, which is diﬀerent from the result of NYSE. Thus, it’s
conﬁrmed that NYSE is suitable for trading the large stocks and Nasdaq for the small
ones. Evidence reﬂects that the illiquidity cost is relative small for the large stocks
on NYSE and small stocks on Nasdaq. The coeﬃcient of unexpected illiquidity rises
in size signiﬁcantly, which is in accordance with the result of NYSE. The coeﬃcient
of relative issuesize is negative and decreasing in size, implies that the big companies
tend to be aﬀected more from the big issue.CHAPTER 4. EMPIRICAL RESULT 35
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Figure 4.10: The trend of Liquidity Impact-NYSE
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Figure 4.11: The trend of Liquidity Impact-NASDAQ
Furthermore, we look into several intervals of SEO period for the sample on Nas-
daq.2 For the period of m =  60 to 41, m =  40 to  21, m =  20 to  1 and
m = 0 to 19, the unexpected illiquidity impact is increasing in size. This trend still
2the 10-month-interval result is not presented because of limitation of the spaceCHAPTER 4. EMPIRICAL RESULT 39
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Figure 4.12: The trend of Liquidity Impact-AMEX
remains strong in the period of m = 20 to 39, and becomes vague after m = 40. The
result conﬁrms that the impact of the expected illiquidity does not vary too much as
size grows. In contrast, the unexpected illiquidity impact grows signiﬁcantly as the
increasing size. In another word, those big ﬁrms, usually regarded as liquid stocks,
and their information asymmetry level is thought to be low. However, they are more
vulnerable when there’s unexpected illiquidity shock or the valuation change during
SEO period.
Table 4.4 presents the regression result of 10 relative issuesize-based portfolios.
Companies issue great amount of stocks tend to suﬀer more from the expected illiq-
uidity but less from the unexpected illiquidity. We can infer that there is stronger
information conveyed to the investors through a large volume of issuing. The of-
fering lowers the information asymmetry of the ﬁrms and makes their return more
predictable by means of aﬀecting their liquidity levels. The trend is also signiﬁcant
on Nasdaq while not for AMEX.CHAPTER 4. EMPIRICAL RESULT 40
In addition, there is also an interesting phenomenon when we look into several in-
tervals of SEO period for the sample on Nasdaq.3 After the SEO announcement, the
issuesize is related with the extent of illiquidity impact. The expected illiquidity im-
pact increases as the issuesize grows, which implies that more information is released
through the relative big volume of equity oﬀering. In another aspect, the unexpected
illiquidity impact decrease as the size grows. An explanation is that, when a large
volume of equity is issued, the ex ante illiquidity should be low. And then a certain
unexpected illiquidity shock aﬀects the liquid stock less, which is called the ”ﬂight to
liquidity”. When there’s an illiquidity shock on the market, the small size company
suﬀers more and the big company stock is more favored by the investors. Therefore,
the mixed eﬀect makes the companies which just increased their capitalization more
favored under the uncertain market condition.
3the result including a series of ﬁgures is not presented because of limitation of the spaceCHAPTER 4. EMPIRICAL RESULT 41
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Figure 4.13: The Issue Size and Liquidity Impact-NYSE
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Figure 4.14: The Issue Size and Liquidity Impact-NASDAQCHAPTER 4. EMPIRICAL RESULT 45
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Figure 4.15: The Issue Size and Liquidity Impact-AMEX
4.2 Liquidity and capital structure
This section examines the relation between the change in leverage and liquidity
using a battery of regression tests for alternate leverage and liquidity expressions.
We follow these direct tests with tests of asymmetric information around the leverage
recapitalization.
For all the empirical tests, we regress the Amihud’s illiquidity on the commonly
used variables that explain the cross-sectional variation in liquidity (Stoll 2000). This
test is the OLS based test, principally stem from Stoll (2000) and include leverage
change, volume, volatility, and operating performance. Inventory holding costs are
proxied with price volatility, order processing costs are proxied by daily trading vol-
ume and asymmetric information costs are proxied by ﬁrm size.
In Table 4.5, lncshtrq is the number of shares traded during the past quarter,
which is log scaled. Prcstd is the daily stock price standard deviation in one month.
TobinQ is deﬁned as long term assets plus the diﬀerence between the market value
of equity to the book value of equity divided by the book value of assets using the
annual Compustat database measured in each of the pre and post SEO periods. ROACHAPTER 4. EMPIRICAL RESULT 46
is the measure of return of return of equity, which is the net income divided by total
assets.
We also separate the ﬁrm listed on diﬀerent exchange. This controls for the general
information environment that presumably would be greater for NYSE/Amex ﬁrms
than for NASDAQ ﬁrms.CHAPTER 4. EMPIRICAL RESULT 47
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As is shown in Table 4.5, the coeﬃcient of DTA is positive and signiﬁcant for
the pooled regression. It conﬁrms that higher leverage is associated with higher
illiquidity. Univariate results show a consistent association between leverage and
liquidity. Adding the control variables does not alter that ﬁnding. The results would
indicate that, using debt-to-all assets coeﬃcient of 11.18 as a base, for a 10% decrease
in leverage (for example, changing from 30% to 20%) coupled with a $100,000 dollar
volume transaction would lead to a 1.118 percent less on the absolute of return.
This return impact is extremely signiﬁcant for the small size companies. It can be
explained that investors usually don’t care about the capital structure change of the
big companies. If the debt-to-all asset ratio increases for big companies, they usually
do not penalize it, but still regard it as a stock of high quality. When some uncertainty
happened on the market, they would still be the good resort of the extra money. It
is the phenomenon that people just think those ﬁrms are too big to fall. The money
invested in those companies is relatively safe, enjoying a high level of liquidity. In
contrast, investors concern the capital structure of the small companies much more
than the big companies. Even a small change of the debt will reﬂect on the stock
liquidity.
The size eﬀect is also signiﬁcant for the estimator of price volatility and number
of the trades. The big companies liquidity level is less aﬀected by the price volatility
and number of trades compared with the small companies. This result is constant
across the three exchanges.CHAPTER 4. EMPIRICAL RESULT 51
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TobinQ has the negative and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient, which implies that the mar-
ket premium value of the ﬁrm do increase the stock liquidity. When investors are
optimistic about the ﬁrm, there will be more price forecast and trading, while for the
distressed ﬁrm, the valuation is diﬃcult, thus the trade becomes less. The TobinQ
impact also decreases in the ﬁrm size, although the statistic signiﬁcance is not that
enough. Generally the estimator of the ROA is negative. The positive sign for the
pooled regression result on Nasdaq and AMEX is mainly driven by the ﬁrst group of
size-portfolio. We believe that some of the small companies are extremely proﬁtable
and also very illiquid. This drives the coeﬃcient extremely high, aﬀecting the overall
result. However, for most of the size portfolios, the coeﬃcient for ROA is negative,
which indicates that the proﬁtable companies tend to be more liquid. This is more
evident for the results of NYSE, compared with Nasdaq and AMEX.
Table 4.6 shows the result in the relative issuesize portfolios. The more the
new stock oﬀering, the bigger marginal impact of the leverage increase on the stock
illiquidity. We can conclude that the more the company deleverage, the higher will be
the marginal illiquidity cost. In addition, the liquidity impact on the stock is bigger
for the large issuing volume in terms of shares traded and price volatility. TobinQ
has the signiﬁcant diﬀerence among issuesize groups. Under the same TobinQ, the
larger issuing companies will be more liquid because of the decreasing marginal eﬀect.
Table 4.7 divides the sample into 10 oﬀerpremium-portfolios. Oﬀer-premium is
the ratio of the SEO price to the average price of the stock before the SEO date. The
coeﬃcients do not reﬂect a signiﬁcant trend, which implies that the oﬀer premium
does not reveal the information to the investors.CHAPTER 4. EMPIRICAL RESULT 55
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Conclusion
In this article, we try to examine the SEO underperformance in the aspect of
liquidity change. As the hypothesis on the relationship between stock return and
stock liquidity is that return increases in illiquidity, as proposed by Amihud and
Mendelson (1986), we assume that, the liquidity change is one of the causes of the
post SEO underperformance and pre SEO overperformance.
We test the liquidity around the SEO period separately on the three exchanges
because NYSE is a specialist-auction market and the NASDAQ is a dealer market.
They each provide price discovery and liquidity services for equity shares, but diﬀer
substantially in design.
We ﬁnd that during the SEO period (a ﬁve year period before and after SEO),
the illiquidity has a positive relation with the stock return. The illiquidity is high
before the SEO period and drop drastically after the SEO announcement. This is
the evidence that, the individual stock level liquidity, do play an important role in
explaining the SEO underperformance.
We divided the illiquidity factor into expected illiquidity and unexpected illiq-
uidity. Generally, big companies suﬀer more from the unexpected illiquidity across
the three exchanges, and the NYSE big companies and Nasdaq small companies are
relatively less sensitive to the expected illiquidity. This implies the matching relation
58CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSION 59
between the trading mechanism and the stocks of diﬀerent corporate size. We also
ﬁnd that the more stock issued, relative to the previous capitalization, the more price
impact will be caused by expected illiquidity, while less by unexpected illiquidity.
This implies that, the large volume of new issuance conveys more information to the
investor, thus decreases the information asymmetry, making the illiquidity impact on
the return more predictable.
Furthermore, we test the theoretical source the illiquidity. We believe the capital
structure change caused by the SEO makes the liquidity change. We ﬁnd the positive
relation between the leverage and the stock illiquidity, that the decreased leverage
makes the stock more liquid, and the large stocks are less aﬀected by the leverage
changes. This is the phenomenon that market is usually not sensitive to the capital
structure of big companies. They are regarded as ones are too big to fall. The
marginal illiquidity cost of leverage is big when the company deleveraging quite a lot.
And there is no evidence that the oﬀer premium, i.e., the oﬀer price relative to the
stock price around the SEO period, provide more information to the investors.
Apart from all the result mentioned above, we still understand that there are so
many liquidity measures in the previous literature. It’s worthwhile to reconﬁrm the
result in this article using more liquidity or market microstructure measures like LOT
or PIN.
Moreover, we may also include variables of institutional holdings. The institu-
tional holding is to allow for larger trade sizes made by institutions that would have a
greater probability of price impact. We assume that the higher levels of institutional
holdings would increase the probability of large trades that would presumably move
the liquidity and stock price.Appendix A
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Market Equilibrium
The market equilibrium follows Kyle (1985). First, the market maker is assumed
to set the price as a linear function of total demand, y1 +x1, and public information,
X0(1 + q1). The market maker cannot observe the source of demand. In addition, to
preclude outside arbitrager from making expected proﬁts based on publicly available
information, the price set by the market maker, s, must satisfy the condition:
E[s   s
qjy1 + x1] = 0 (B.1)
sq is the publicly observed value of the stock. Second, the informed agent submits
order ﬂow independent of the uninformed demand, so that ex-ante trading proﬁts are
maximized.
x1 = arcmaxxX1E[s
i   sjs
q + ϵ1(1 + D/S0)] (B.2)
si is the stock price that reﬂects the informed agent’s private information. In
particular, it is assumed that the informed trader follows a linear demand schedule,
given below:
x1(ϵ,D/S0) = a + Bϵ1(1 + D/S0) (B.3)
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Third, market equilibrium is determined jointly by the market maker’s pricing
condition, the informed agent’s rationality condition, and the informed agent’s lin-
earity restriction. The solution to this problem is given in Kyle (1985) and is:
x1 =
s   sq
2λ
and s = s
q + λ(x1 + y1) (B.4)
where (1/λ) is the market liquidity. The joint association between the informed
demand and capital structure yields a liquidity relation stated as:
L =
1
λ
=
2σµ
σϵ
(
1 + D
S0
) (B.5)